

Alex C. Michalos

Philosophical Foundations of Quality of Life

The Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos

 Springer

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Other Books by Alex C. Michalos

North American Social Report, 5 volumes
Global Report on Student Well-Being, 4 volumes
Essays on the Quality of Life
Ancient Views on the Quality of Life
Militarism and the Quality of Life
Foundations of Decision Making
Trade Barriers to the Public Good
Good Taxes
A Pragmatic Approach to Business Ethics
Principles of Logic
Improving Your Reasoning
The Popper-Carnap Controversy

For Deborah, with love

Acknowledgements

Most of the previously published papers in this set of four volumes (and most of my books) appeared in a publication of Springer, Kluwer, Reidel or Nijhoff, a chain of publishers that I have had the opportunity to work with since the 1960s. Since the original source of each paper in the collection is given on its first page in this collection, there is no need to repeat all these sources and express my thanks for permission to reprint them in each occurrence. I am happy to express here my gratitude for the lot and for the many years of our pleasant and productive work together.

In each of the volumes in this set, I will acknowledge permission to reprint each of the previously published papers appearing in scholarly journals, books or newspapers apart from the chain of publishers listed above. In this first volume, I would like to thank Victoria University of Wellington, Australia for Chap. 2. Weijers, D. (2014). An interview with Alex C. Michalos. *International Journal of Wellbeing*, 4: 1–6.; UNESCO Publishers for Chap. 5. Michalos, A.C. (2006). Logic, philosophy of science and the quality of life. In *Philosophy and World Problems*, John McMurtry (Ed.). *Encyclopedia of Life Support Systems (EOLSS)*, Developed under the Auspices of the UNESCO, Eolss Publishers, Paris, France (<http://www.eolss.net>); University of Chicago Press for Chap. 6. Michalos, A.C. (1979). Philosophy of Social Science. In P.D. Asquith & H. Kyburg (Eds.). *Current Research in Philosophy of Science*, (pp. 463–502). Baltimore: Philosophy of Science Association; Philosophy of Science Association for Chap. 7. Michalos, A.C. (1967). Postulates of rational preference. *Philosophy of Science*, 34: 18–22; University of Illinois Press for Chap. 8. Michalos, A.C. (1970). Decision making in committees. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 7: 91–106; Oxford University Press for Chap. 9. Michalos, A.C. (1970). Analytic and other ‘dumb’ guides of life. *Analysis*, 30: 121–123; Canadian Philosophical Association for Chap. 11. Michalos, A.C. (1988). Meeting current needs. *Dialogue*, 27: 507–515.

In the Appendix of each volume, I included some photographs and pictures to provide a somewhat different kind of historical context to my narrative. What I have been able to contribute over the past 50 years or so have been influenced by many

more people than I have been able to picture here, but when I reflect on what I have done, most of the people pictured here are very much a part of the story. Most of the photographs and pictures are from my family albums, but some have come from friends and a couple newspapers. I would like to express my thanks to the following for allowing me to reprint their items: Wolfgang Glatzer for photographs in *How Good Policies and Business Ethics Enhance Good Quality of Life*, numbered v2.1 (short for photo #1, volume 2), in *Development of the Quality of Life Theory and its Instruments* (v3.3, v3.5, and v3.6), and in *Connecting the Quality of Life Theory to Health, Well-Being and Education* (v4.1); to Ferran Casas for photographs v2.6, v3.1, v3.2 and v3.4; to Filomena Maggino for v4.4, v4.5 and v4.6; to Anna L.D. lau and Roberty A. Cummins for v4.3, v4.8 and v4.9; to Valerie Moller for v3.7 and v3.8; to Joanna Kit-Chun Lam for v3.11; to Daniel T.L. Shek for v4.2; to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* for *Philosphical Foundations of Quality of Life* (v1.4), and to the *Detroit Free Press* for v1.7.

Contents

1	Alex C. Michalos: Pioneer of Quality of Life and Social Indicators Research	1
	Bruno D. Zumbo	
2	Interview by Dan Weijers	5
	Dan Weijers	
	What Got You Interested in Wellbeing Research?	5
	What Do You Take “Wellbeing” to Mean?	6
	Why Is Wellbeing Research Important?	6
	What Is the Most Important Wellbeing-Related Finding from Your Research?	6
	What Are You Working on Right Now?	7
	What Do You Think the Next Big Thing in Wellbeing Research Will Be?	8
	What Are the Main Benefits of Interdisciplinary Research on Wellbeing?	8
	What Would the Ideal Census Question on Wellbeing Be and Why?	8
	What Parts of Your Research Have Brought You the Most Enjoyment and/or Satisfaction?	9
	What Parts of Your Research Have Brought You the Most Dissatisfaction and/or Displeasure?	9
	Is There Anything Else You Would like to Comment on?	10
	References	11
3	The Best Teacher I Ever Had Was ... J. Coert Rylaarsdam.	13
	Alex C. Michalos	
4	The Case for Atheism.	17
	Alex C. Michalos	
	Introductory Comments	17

The General Argument 18

Examples of a Creation at War with Itself 23

Summary of the Last 7 Arguments 24

5 Logic, Philosophy of Science and the Quality of Life 25

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 25

Logical Foundations 26

Philosophy of Science 30

Scientific Significance 31

Theory and Observation 33

Discovery and Growth 37

Explanation 42

Induction 47

Probability 49

Utility 51

Social Responsibility 52

Quality of Life 55

Glossary 59

Bibliography 64

6 Philosophy of Social Science 67

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 67

Aspects of the Problem 67

Part One of the Solution: Dissertations 70

Part Two of the Solution: Articles 72

Part Three of the Solution: Books 75

Suggestions for the Future 78

The Future Following Past Performance 78

The Future Beyond the Present Main Stream 80

Appendix 1: Issues Discussed or Theses Defended in Recent
Dissertations in Philosophy of Social Science 82

Appendix 2: Dissertation Bibliography. Philosophy of Social
Science 1961–1977 86

Appendix 3: Proceedings and Colloquia Volumes 91

References 93

7 Postulates of Rational Preference 97

Alex C. Michalos

References 101

8 Decision-Making in Committees 103

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 103

The Problem 104

Criteria of Adequacy 105

Weighting Voters 108

Weighted Voting 113

Objections and Replies: Weighting Voters 118

Objections and Replies: Weighted Voting 126

Conclusion 129

9 Analytic and Other “DUMB” Guides of Life 131

Alex C. Michalos

10 The Morality of Cognitive Decision-Making [Ethics of Belief] 135

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 135

The Question 135

The Case for a Negative Ethics of Belief 138

The Case Against a Negative Ethics of Belief 141

The Case for a Positive Ethics of Belief 144

The Case Against a Positive Ethics of Belief 146

The Case Against Any Ethics of Belief 146

Conclusion 149

11 Meeting Current Needs 151

Alex C. Michalos

12 A Reconsideration of the Idea of a Science Court 159

Alex C. Michalos

Outline of the Science Court Experiment 160

 Initiation. 160

 Organization. 160

 Suggested Procedures. 160

Conclusion 176

13 Technology Assessment, Facts and Values 177

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 177

Fact and Value: Ontology. 178

Fact and Falsehood: Epistemology 180

From Ontology to Epistemology. 181

From Ontology to Methodology 185

Theories of Value. 187

 Naturalistic Objectivism. 191

 Naturalistic Subjectivism 191

 Nonnaturalistic Objectivism 192

 Nonnaturalistic Subjectivism 192

 Emotivism 193

Prescriptivism. 194

Rational Decision-Making 195

Conclusion 196

14 A Pragmatic Theory of Value 197

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 197

Satisfaction 199

Criteria of Adequacy 201

Generic Value. 203

Objective Value 205

Moral Value 210

Objections to Consequentialism 212

Epistemic Value 223

Rationality 226

References 226

**15 Creating a Culture of Support for the Social Sciences:
Lessons from the First Forty Years of the Social Science
Federation of Canada. 229**

Alex C. Michalos

Introduction 229

Ad Hoc Meeting 1 230

Ad Hoc Meeting 2 232

Ad Hoc Meeting 3 233

Ad Hoc Meeting 4 235

Ad Hoc Meeting 5 237

Ad Hoc Meeting 6 237

Reflections on Directions 240

Canadian Research Council in the Social Sciences, First Meeting 242

CRCSS, Second Meeting 243

The Official First Annual Meeting of the CRCSS. 244

CRCSS Executive Meeting, November 4, 1944 245

CRCSS Annual Meeting, December 15, 1945 245

CRCSS Annual Meeting, November 1, 1946 246

CRCSS Annual Meeting, October 25, 1947 246

CRCSS Annual Meeting, June 12, 1948. 247

CRCSS Executive Meeting, January 22, 1949 247

CRCSS Annual Meeting, October 29, 1949 248

Executive Meeting, February 25, 1950. 249

Annual Meeting, June 3, 1950 250

Annual Meeting, June 3, 1951 250

Meetings from November 1952 to March 1956 252

Meetings, June 9, 1956 to November 30, 1957 254

Meetings, 1958	256
Meetings, 1960–1962	257
Meetings, 1963–1965	261
Meetings, 1966–1968	263
The Social Sciences in Canada (Timlin-Faucher Report)	265
Meetings in 1968	269
Meetings in 1969–1970	272
1970–1973	277
Critical Choices	285
Conclusions	287
References	288
16 Notes for a System of Scientific Research Reports Accounts	291
Alex C. Michalos	
Appendix	299

Overview of the “The Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos”

How Good Policies and Business Ethics Enhance Good Quality of Life

1	Social Sciences and Business Ethics	1
	Alex C. Michalos	
2	Business Ethics and the Quality of Life	5
	Alex C. Michalos	
3	The Costs of Decision-Making	13
	Alex C. Michalos	
4	Efficiency and Morality	27
	Alex C. Michalos	
5	Rationality Between the Maximizers and the Satisficers	35
	Alex C. Michalos	
6	The Loyal Agent’s Argument	53
	Alex C. Michalos	
7	Moral Responsibility in Business, or Fourteen Unsuccessful Ways to Pass the Buck	63
	Alex C. Michalos	
8	A Case for a Progressive Annual Net Wealth Tax	81
	Alex C. Michalos	
9	Militarism and the Quality of Life	111
	Alex C. Michalos	
10	The Impact of Trust on Business, International Security and the Quality of Life	127
	Alex C. Michalos	

11 Ethical Considerations Regarding Public Opinion Polling During Election Campaigns 155
 Alex C. Michalos

12 Brief to the Ontario Cabinet Committee on North American Free Trade 185
 Alex C. Michalos

13 Issues for Business Ethics in the Nineties and Beyond. 197
 Alex C. Michalos

14 Observations on Performance Indicators and Performance-Based Management in Public Administration 213
 Alex C. Michalos

15 The Integration of Public Policy-Making with Outcomes Measurement. 235
 Alex C. Michalos

16 A Handful of Sand in the Wheels of Financial Speculation. 251
 Alex C. Michalos

17 Ethics Counselors as a New Priesthood 273
 Alex C. Michalos

18 Observations on the Proposed BC—STV Voting System. 293
 Alex C. Michalos

19 Ancient Observations on Business Ethics: Middle East Meets West. 297
 Alex C. Michalos

20 The Monster of Supercapitalism 313
 Alex C. Michalos

21 The Business Case for Asserting the Business Case for Business Ethics 329
 Alex C. Michalos

22 Public Policy Letters to Editors 1989–2001. 343
 Alex C. Michalos

Appendix. 377

Development of Quality of Life Theory and Its Instruments

1 Quality of Life, Two-Variable Theory. 1
 Alex C. Michalos

2	Satisfaction and Happiness	5
	Alex C. Michalos	
3	Multiple Discrepancies Theory (MDT)	39
	Alex C. Michalos	
4	A Feminist View of Women and Development	97
	Alex C. Michalos	
5	Highlights of Four Volume Global Report on Student Well-Being	103
	Alex C. Michalos	
6	Comments on Papers for the Special Issue on Global Report on Student Well-Being	111
	Alex C. Michalos	
7	Aspects of the Quality of Life in Prince George: A Case Study in Canada	117
	Alex C. Michalos	
8	Quality of Life in Jasper, Alberta	137
	Bruno D. Zumbo and Alex C. Michalos	
9	British Columbians’ Expectations and Attitudes Going into the Third Millennium	157
	Alex C. Michalos and Bruno D Zumbo	
10	Identifying The Horse, The Cart and Their Proper Order in Sustainable Development	175
	Alex C. Michalos	
11	Connecting Communities with Community Indicators	185
	Alex C. Michalos	
12	Stability and Sensitivity in Perceived Quality of Life Measures: Some Panel Results	199
	Alex C. Michalos and P. Maurine Kahlke	
13	Arts and the Perceived Quality of Life in British Columbia	241
	Alex C. Michalos and P. Maurine Kahlke	
14	What Did Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi Get Right and What Did They Get Wrong?	287
	Alex C. Michalos	

15 Progress in Measuring Knowledge, Attitudes and Behaviours Concerning Sustainable Development Among Tenth Grade Students in Manitoba 301
 Alex C. Michalos, P. Maurine Kahlke, Karen Rempel, Anu Lounatvuori, Anne MacDiarmid, Heather Creech and Carolee Buckler

16 Social Indicators Research: The Little Red Hen 40 Years Later 337
 Alex C. Michalos

17 Michalos-Zumbo Well-Being Index 341
 Bruno D. Zumbo and Alex C. Michalos

Appendix. 347

Connecting the Quality of Life Theory to Health, Well-Being and Education

1 Cost-Benefit Versus Expected Utility Acceptance Rules. 1
 Alex C. Michalos

2 Social Indicators Research and Health-Related Quality of Life Research 25
 Alex C. Michalos

3 Culture as a Moderator of Overall Life Satisfaction—Life Facet Satisfaction Relationships. 59
 Alison G.C. Mallard, Charles E. Lance and Alex C. Michalos

4 Determinants of Health and the Quality of Life in the Bella Coola Valley 81
 Alex C. Michalos, Harvey V. Thommasen, Rua Read, Nancy Anderson and Bruno D. Zumbo

5 Health and Quality of Life of Aboriginal Residential School Survivors, Bella Coola Valley, 2001 123
 Sylvia S. Barton, Harvey V. Thommasen, Bill Tallio, William Zhang and Alex C. Michalos

6 Comparing Self-rated Health, Satisfaction and Quality of Life Scores Between Diabetics and Others Living in the Bella Coola Valley 137
 Angela Grigg, Harvey V. Thommasen, Hugh Tildesley and Alex C. Michalos

7	The Relationship Between Health Survey and Medical Chart Review Results in a Rural Population	151
	Donald C. Voaklander, Harvey V. Thommasen and Alex C. Michalos	
8	Health and Quality of Life of Older People, a Replication After Six Years	165
	Alex C. Michalos, P. Maurine Hatch, Dawn Hemingway, Loraine Lavallee, Anne Hogan and Bev Christensen	
9	Good Health is Not the Same as a Good Life: Survey Results from Brandon, Manitoba	201
	Alex C. Michalos, Douglas Ramsey, Derrek Eberts and P. Maurine Kahlke	
10	A Note on Student Quality of Life	247
	Alex C. Michalos and Julie Anne Orlando	
11	Quality of Life of Some Under-Represented Survey Respondents: Youth, Aboriginals and Unemployed	255
	Alex C. Michalos and Julie Anne Orlando	
12	Education, Happiness and Wellbeing	277
	Alex C. Michalos	
13	A Developmental View of Liberal Education	301
	Alex C. Michalos	
14	Einstein, Ethics and Science	313
	Alex C. Michalos	
15	Observations on Unacknowledged Authorship from Homer to Now	327
	Alex C. Michalos	
16	Building the Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research	335
	Alex C. Michalos	
17	Milestones of Quality of Life Research in Canada, 1960s to 2014	347
	Alex C. Michalos	
	Appendix	397

Introduction to “Selected Works of Alex C. Michalos”

Biographical Notes

The central aim of this set of volumes is to describe and explain the context and connections among a subset of papers and books produced over the past 50 years. Rather than a mere reproduction of work already published, this will be an attempt to disclose the productive processes in their various historic contexts that led to the various research projects and publications. In Michalos (2003a), I published a collection called *Essays on the Quality of Life* containing 20 articles focused on the quality of life, 3 of which appear in other volumes of this set because they seemed to be so central to the array of issues in the 70 articles in these volumes. For completeness, I mention articles from the earlier collection and books that are directly relevant to the themes in these volumes.

Some years ago (these days it seems that most things begin with “some years ago”, unfortunately), in a debate about the existence of God, a member of the audience put a question to us “Why would God want to watch re-runs?” The question made sense from the point of view of one of the debaters, since God was supposed to know everything that is going to happen before it happens. As the atheist in the debate, I could only say that I have no idea why, although a lot of people seem to enjoy them.

While I also enjoy some re-runs, I would not find much joy in re-binding some old papers for a new audience. I do, however, find the idea of describing the historical context in which similar research questions more or less simultaneously appeared to people in diverse parts of the globe and were addressed first individually and then collectively. Here, the historical context includes some of my own biographical material. This is offered as a kind of second-best effort substituting for an autobiography that I have never had the courage to write, notwithstanding having thought about it many times.

My father ended his formal education in the sixth grade and my mother ended hers in the eighth grade. As far as I have been able to discern, in 1917, when he was about 17, my father, Charles K. Michalos, emigrated from the island of Chios,

Greece, to work in the steel mills of Gary, Indiana. He arrived with a pocket-sized Greek–English dictionary, learned to speak English with a heavy Greek accent, moved from the mills to driving a Nabisco bread and pastry truck for another 17 years, bought a small hamburger joint, then a somewhat bigger one and finally something more like a diner on Euclid Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. Its claim to fame was the fact that many of the Cleveland Browns ate there, which was quite a big deal in 1947 when the Browns were the All American Football Conference champions, and I was one of their biggest junior high school fans. My father died in January 1951, at about 51. We were never sure, because he was never sure, how old he was. I was daddy's boy, and his loss was a great loss to me.

My mother, Josephine Pucci, was born in Akron, Ohio, one of eight children of immigrants from Palermo, Sicily. She worked at the May Company department store, sang in the chorus of the Cleveland Opera Company, married my father in 1931, produced my brother in 1932 and me in 1935, and provided the mom part of our mom-and-pop diner. Unlike my dad, she was not a particularly happy person, but she lived to be 93 years old, dying in June 1998. Like my dad, and the rest of us I guess, she did the best she could with what she had.

I was generally an above average but not outstanding primary and secondary school student. In secondary school and the first half of university, I was more interested in sports and girls than scholarship, though I enjoyed mathematics and history. I went to what was then Western Reserve University (now Case-Western Reserve University) in 1953, majoring in history with minors in philosophy and religion. When I read Plato's *Republic*, I felt as if he was talking directly to me. It had never occurred to me to ask what a good life might be, but the more I thought about it, the more I *had* to think about it.

I grew up in a very mixed religious family. The story my mother told was that her family were Catholics until the local priest did something that led my grandfather to tell him to go to hell and he took the whole gene pool into a more friendly Baptist church. My father seemed to practice the religion of washing his car on Sundays, but he thought his sons had to be baptized Greek Orthodox in order to preserve something or other that was important to him. So, we were. However, because our house was one block away from a small Quaker church, my brother, Chuck Michalos, and I were sent off together as soon as we were old enough to find our way there and back. I have a gold medal showing that I accumulated three years of Sundays without missing Quaker Sunday school.

Given this background, when I began to think seriously about a good life, I thought I should make my peace with God if there were one. So, besides studying philosophy, I studied the history of religions. Then I went to graduate school at the University of Chicago. Because I was what one would have called a doubter, I wanted to study religion in a school of believers, assuming that if anyone could convince me that I was wrong, they could. At least they would be inclined to try. So, in 1957 I enrolled in the Divinity School, which seemed to have the most diverse faculty, including visiting experts in Buddhism, which especially interested me.

I also married in the summer of 1957, a marriage that lasted about 23 years and produced Cyndi (1960), Ted (1961) and Stephanie (1963). In 1985, I married the love of my life, Deborah Poff, a lucky break for both of us at the time and ever since.

While studying the history of religions, I took courses in philosophy and it seemed to me that philosophers had more precise and decisive methods of pursuing the truth than theologians. The University of Chicago had a wonderfully flexible approach to higher education, allowing students to pursue more than one degree at a time. To get a Bachelor of Divinity degree, a student was required to pass 7 comprehensive exams and have a year internship in some relevant field of practice. I took some courses designed to prepare one to take the exams and some courses in philosophy that I found interesting. At the 1961 convocation, I received a B.D. and an M.A. in philosophy, and then proceeded to pursue a Ph.D. in philosophy of science. I completed the latter in 1965 with a dissertation on a dispute between Rudolf Carnap and Karl Popper on the nature and use of probability theory in the assessment of scientific theories (Michalos 1971).

Many of the most salient and important features of the following 50 years of research and other activities may be regarded as relatively natural developments of these earlier initiatives. In a memorable essay on the best teacher he ever had, Keyfitz (2003) said that scholars should replace the metaphor of providing building blocks for a relatively durable corporate body of knowledge with that of providing biodegradable nutrition out of which new knowledge would grow. In a sense, today's nutrient is tomorrow's fertilizer. What I did until 1965 provided the ingredients for what followed, just as the latter will feed what comes afterward. Most importantly, I think my general approach has been informed by a pragmatic and philosophic interest in a holistic, comprehensive understanding of any particular object of investigation. I will try to explain this approach in the next few paragraphs.

Broadly speaking, there are two ways to define "*philosophy*". From a *functional* point of view, philosophy may be identified as critical thinking about anything at all, from asphalt to zebras. From a *content* point of view, philosophy may be identified as a body of knowledge answering three questions. What is it? What good is it? How do you know?

Answering the question "What is it?" gives one a discussion of the nature or being of something. In short, it gives one an *ontology*, a word derived from the Greek "on" meaning nature or being, and logos, meaning discourse (among other things). Descriptions of the nature of things, ontologies, have at least two aspects. Everything has, after all, a form, structure, morphology or anatomy on the one hand, and a function, activity or physiology on the other. A duck, smile or football game, for example, can be described at a minimum by describing their structural parts and how the parts function. What Isaac Newton might have referred to as natural philosophy and we now would call natural science is close to what philosophers would call ontology.

Answering the question "What good is it?" gives one a discussion of the value, worth or goodness in some sense of something. In short, it gives one an *axiology*, a

word derived from the Greek "axios" meaning worthy or valuable, and logos. Of the variety of kinds of value that may be described, it is most useful to distinguish intrinsic from instrumental value. *Intrinsic value* refers to the worth or goodness of a thing in itself, its value as an end in itself rather than as a means to something else. *Instrumental value* refers to the worth or goodness of a thing as a means to something else, not as a thing in itself. Standard examples include things such as eating an apple or throwing a ball at a target having instrumental value insofar as the former produces nutrition and the latter scores points, which in this context have intrinsic value.

Since practically anything might be a useful means to something else for someone in some circumstances for some purposes, practically anything can have instrumental value. However, some people believe that all alleged sorts of intrinsic value may be reduced to a single one. For example, they would argue that the nutrition obtained from eating an apple is really only instrumentally valuable as a means to good health, which is itself instrumentally valuable for a life of pleasure, happiness or satisfaction. Those who believe that there is finally only one intrinsically valuable thing such as pleasure, happiness or satisfaction may be called monists with respect to the ultimate nature (ontological status) of value, while those who believe that there are many intrinsically valuable things may be called pluralists.

For a monist, then, it may be said that ontologically distinct things such as music, cheese and justice have different degrees of some sort of value such as pleasure, happiness or satisfaction, while for a pluralist, such ontologically distinct things have ontologically distinct values (music value, cheese value and justice value) regardless of how much pleasure, happiness or satisfaction these things produce. From an ontological point of view, then, a monist would have a numerically smaller number of ontologically distinct things in his or her world (e.g. music, cheese, justice and some degree of pleasure, happiness or satisfaction generated by the other three), while a pluralist's world would have music, cheese, justice plus music value, cheese value and justice value.

For a monist, the task of measuring the total value of something, a person, event, object, attitude, belief, proposition, action or life itself, is in principle straightforward. One simply needs to measure the degree of intrinsic value generated by that thing in terms of or operationalized as pleasure, happiness or satisfaction. For pluralists, the task of measuring the total value of something is not at all straightforward because there may be no way to compare ontologically distinct values like the value of music versus the value of cheese or justice. There does not appear to be any common measure, scale or instrument available to answer questions such as "How much is music worth compared to the value of justice or cheese?" or "What is the value of this piece of music in terms of the value of justice or cheese?"

Given the severe comparability problems faced by all value pluralists, it is not surprising that the most frequently studied theories of economists and decision theorists, namely preference theory, choice theory, utility theory and game theory, and one of the most popular ethical theories studied by philosophers, utilitarianism,

assume value monism of some sort. As we will see in many of the papers in this collection and many more cited in those papers, scholars have invented a great variety of methods for living in and managing a world apparently containing a plurality of values. In particular, I will describe my own efforts over about 50 years, which have been interesting but largely unsuccessful.

Answering the question "How do you know?" gives a discussion of one's knowledge of something. In short, it gives one an *epistemology*, a word derived from the Greek "episteme" meaning knowledge and logos, hence, a theory of knowledge. Strictly speaking one ought, prudentially and morally, to have a fairly clear answer to the epistemological question before one attempts to answer the ontological and axiological questions. Since a philosopher aims to obtain a body of knowledge about the nature and value of things to be used in the practice of living a good life, a patently necessary condition of achieving that aim is clarity with respect to knowledge itself and its production. That is why the earliest essays in these 4 volumes concern epistemological issues.

Comments on the Articles

All of the papers in this set of volumes are arranged partly in chronological order and partly by their logical connections. Each volume has its own major themes and within those themes articles have been selected and arranged to provide some idea of the time at which they appeared and its relation to my own and others' research agendas around that time.

In this volume, we begin with three biographical articles. Chapter 1 is a biographical sketch written by Bruno Zumbo for a series of similar articles on pioneers of quality of life research in the journal *Applied Research in Quality of Life*, the official journal of the International Society for Quality of Life Studies. This is followed by a transcript of an interview I gave to Dan Weijers for a similar kind of series in the *International Journal of Wellbeing*. While Zumbo's chapter is a relatively objective overview of my professional life described in his voice, Weijers's chapter gives someone a more subjective overview in my own voice. The website of ISQOLS has a number of videos of interviews of pioneers in its series, one by Michael B. Frisch covering Michalos.

Since I was a university professor for 40 years, I spent a lot of time reading and thinking about teaching, observing and talking to other teachers, preparing to teach, trying to teach, teaching, evaluating my teaching, trying to improve my teaching, succeeding and failing probably in equal measure. As part of this lifelong interest, in Michalos (2003b) I put together 124 essays written by Fellows of the Royal Society of Canada, an honorary association of Canada's most productive scholars, describing the best teacher they ever had. Chapter 3 below, on J. Coert Rylaarsdam, was originally published in *Teaching Business Ethics*, a scholarly journal that I co-founded and edited with Deborah Poff. (I founded or co-founded 7 scholarly

journals, including *Social Indicators Research*, *Journal of Business Ethics*, *Teaching Business Ethics*, *Journal of Happiness Studies*, *Journal of Academic Ethics*, *Applied Research on the Quality of Life* and the *Asian Journal of Business Ethics*.) It was reproduced in the Royal Society collection.) If I was ever any good as a teacher, I owe much of it to Rylaarsdam.

After leaving Divinity School, I seldom gave any thought to theological issues except when I was teaching introductory philosophy courses or asked to participate in public panel discussions. Chapter 4 is a set of notes I used in a panel discussion on the question of the existence of God.

Chapter 5 provides a summary of some of my basic epistemological beliefs, including elementary principles of logic and fundamental issues in the philosophy of science, e.g. the nature of scientific explanation, theories, laws and probabilistic assessment of the acceptability of scientific theories. These are the subjects I taught every year of the 40 years I worked in universities. Following this review, I address the axiological question of the contribution these subjects can make to the definition, measure and living a life of a morally good quality. Within the limits of a relatively brief essay, this chapter connects much of what I routinely taught my whole career with what became my primary research field across most of the period. My first three books and two anthologies were on logic and the philosophy of science: *Principles of Logic* (1969), *Improving Your Reasoning* (1970), *The Popper-Carnap Controversy* (1971), *Philosophic Problems of Science and Technology* (1974) and *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 32, Proceedings of the 1974 Biennial Meeting of Philosophy of Science Association* (1976, co-edited with R.S. Cohen, C.A. Hooker and J.W. Van Evra).

A shorter version of Chap. 6 was presented at a conference in Reston, Virginia, in October 1977 on Critical Research Problems organized by a committee of the Philosophy of Science Association and sponsored by the US National Science Foundation. The committee consisted of Henry E. Kyburg, Peter Asquith, Arthur Burks, David Hull, Alex Michalos and Ernan McMullin. After the conference, authors were asked to produce longer versions that included information obtained from conference discussions. Twenty-eight essays were then published in a volume edited by Asquith and Kyburg in 1979. Each essay was supposed to provide readers with a guide to the current problems being researched in the field and to suggest problems for research in the future. My contribution covered roughly 20 years of research in the philosophy of social sciences. A review of 571 abstracts from social science journals showed that "more work was put on decision-making than on anything else. Forty-nine articles were devoted to this subject. Moreover, since most of the articles on values (46), rationality (25) and utility (21) are related to decision making, this subject easily dominates the literature in the philosophy of social science". Readers of this chapter will find a good illustration of one piece of the sort of research field review often called for by the founders of the Social Sciences Federation of Canada in Chap. 15.

Chapters 7–11 all deal with some features of decision-making. My fourth book, *Foundations of Decision Making* (1978), contains my most comprehensive and considered views about this topic, some of which are also represented in *How Good*

Policies and Business Ethics Enhance Good Quality of Life of this collection. In Chap. 7, I showed that the postulates of rational preference used by decision theorists most famously since the classic treatise of John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (1944) are "inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles". In Chap. 8, I proposed and evaluated a type of group decision-making procedure "distinguished by the fact that inequalities in the 'weight' of individual voters *and* their votes are permitted". The upshot of the discussion is that it seems to be the case that the standard democratic procedure with each person having one equally weighted vote is at least as good as any of the systems considered.

In his classic *Logical Foundations of Probability* (1950), Rudolf Carnap reiterated a traditional positivist view that, because it is impossible to completely verify any empirical claim, statements about the probability of such claims should be a "guide of life". In Chap. 9, I showed that some fine contemporary philosophers of science (A.J. Ayer, P.K. Feyerabend, W.C. Salmon and W.C. Kneale) who challenged this view were mistaken. Some logically true or analytic probability statements can, should and do function as guides to human action, and some are better than others.

In Chap. 10, I describe and analyze a dispute that arose in 1886 between the British philosopher W.K. Clifford and the American philosopher William James over the question whether or not someone could be morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for deciding that something is true or false. Nobody doubts that people's actions are always subject to moral appraisal, but many people believe that decisions made merely about beliefs or what to believe, so-called cognitive decisions, are not subject to such appraisal. Briefly, this disagreement is traditionally known as the problem of an ethics of belief. James and Clifford both believed that there is an ethics of belief, but they disagreed on its content and prescriptions. I evaluate the arguments of each philosopher and show that James had a more plausible case.

Chapter 11 is a critical review of David Braybrooke's *Meeting Needs* (1987), including some comments from an exchange we had in a panel discussion of the book at the 1987 annual meeting of the Canadian Philosophical Association. It is included here because concepts of needing and wanting are basic elements in my *Foundations of Decision Making* and because many people have suggested that a system of social indicators or social accounts should be based on a hierarchy of human needs as explained in, for example, A.H. Maslow's *Motivation and Personality* (1954). The suggestion is typically made by people who assume that needs provide a relatively objective basis for such systems, and Braybrooke's explication of the concept or concepts of needs makes a similar assumption. I show that any plausible explication of a concept of needs is essentially evaluative and contingent upon someone's subjective assessments, implying that it would be a mistake to search for a completely objective basis for systems based on needs.

In the 1970s, the Philosophy of Science Association began to make room in its annual conferences for sessions on philosophy of technology. Lines between technology and science are a bit fuzzy, but philosophers interested primarily in the

former seemed to be concerned with axiological/ethical issues while those interested primarily in the latter were concerned with epistemological issues. By 1976, philosophers of technology became convinced that their interests would always only be marginally represented at philosophy of science conferences. So the Society for Philosophy and Technology was born. Since I had interests and friends in both areas of research, I became active in the new organization, serving a term as President in 1983–85. Chapters 12 and 13 were written in the context of developing this organization.

Chapter 12 begins with the sentence "In August 1976 the U.S. Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology published an interim report on something they called 'The Science Court Experiment'". The aim of the Court was to provide an unbiased, transparent and decisive adjudication procedure for public policy making concerning scientific and technological innovations. I thought the idea promised some relief from the frequently occurring problem of experts routinely appearing for and against innovations with no mutually agreed-upon set of rules for deciding which experts were right. My paper reviewed all the arguments of proponents and opponents of the Court, with the aim of clearing its path for future development. As it turned out, it had no future.

The thesis defended in Chap. 13 is a product of considerations that arose in my analysis of the Science Court. In this chapter, I show that "there are good theoretical and practical reasons to avoid any appeals to a fact-value distinction in the assessment of technology". After drawing an ontological distinction between facts and values versus an epistemological distinction between facts (truths) and falsehoods, I analyze five types of unsound arguments used in technology assessment and other public policy making based on confusing the ontological and epistemological distinctions. Then, I sketch 6 theories of value, i.e. theories designed to reveal its nature or ontological structure. One of these theories, that I call *naturalistic subjectivism*, has driven a great deal of my research.

Chapter 14 contains my most ambitious effort to construct a naturalistic subjectivist theory of value building on the work of American pragmatists, mostly Ralph Barton Perry *General Theory of Value* (1926), John Dewey *Theory of Valuation* (1939) and Clarence Irving Lewis *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (1946). The general plan was to define value in a naturalistic way as the human psychological attribute, satisfaction. So, briefly, following the traditional monistic position, something would have value just so far as it produced satisfaction for someone, and the more satisfaction produced in more people, the more valuable anything would become. A detailed set of proposed definitions for the foundation of such a theory is presented in the chapter, awaiting only an empirical theory of satisfaction to complete the story. Armed with such an empirically based theory of value, in principle it would be possible to scientifically and relatively objectively evaluate every aspect of our world and measure its total worth. Multiple discrepancies theory (MDT) was supposed to be the empirical theory of satisfaction (Michalos 1985) required for the empirically based theory of value, and *North American Social Report* (1980a, b, 1981a, b, 1982) was supposed to be an empirical

assessment of the quality of life in Canada and the USA in the 1964–74 period based on that naturalistic subjectivist theory. An overview of the *North American Social Report* is presented in the fourth volume (Connecting the Quality of Life Theory to Health, Well-Being and Education) of this collection with other Canadian milestones. As it turned out, MDT involves some circularity preventing it from providing a thoroughly empirical basis of value, there is no generally accepted set of purely descriptive features of any country and no known way to evaluate such features using MDT. So, the grand plan could not be implemented although, hopefully, the articles and discussions in these 4 volumes will reveal something useful for the next person with some such plan.

Chapter 15 is a historical account of the development of what was the Social Sciences Federation of Canada from 1938 to 1980. Since 1996, the organization has been the Federation for the Humanities and Social Sciences, representing “over 80 scholarly associations, 79 institutions and six affiliate organizations, representing 85,000 researchers, educators and students across Canada” (<http://www.ideas-idees.ca/about/about-the-federation>). The history is written as a story of how an ad hoc group of relatively far-sighted social scientists collaborated to build an institution designed to nurture a culture of support for social scientific research in Canada. The focus is on the variety of players over the period, their views about what should and could be done, what actually was done and what were the important lessons for the future.

The final article, appearing as Chap. 16, is a brief sketch of the flow of research reports representing the most visible output of scientific investigation mapped onto the scheme of the National Income and Product Accounts. The aim was to try to craft a kind of input–output system that would allow something like an accounting system for a country’s scientific research.

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Chapter 1

Alex C. Michalos: Pioneer of Quality of Life and Social Indicators Research

Bruno D. Zumbo



When I think of *pioneers* I imagine a hardy people traveling from a former life to a new unsettled place full of unknowns. My image of pioneers is influenced by John Wayne movies and the TV show *Bonanza*. These pioneers are, of course, not starting from nothing because they bring with them their tools, ideas, and beliefs from their earlier lives. I imagine life as a pioneer to be risky, exhausting, and chalk full of prospecting.

These images capture some of the main features of what I imagine to be my friend and longtime research collaborator Alex C. Michalos' pioneering life in quality life and social indicators research. He traveled from the comforts of a

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well-established and highly successful life well known for his work in philosophy of science, logic, and ethics to break new ground in social indicators and quality of life research. He brought with him his tools of theorizing and formalism as well as a love for data, surveys, evaluation and decision making, data analysis and a deep foundation in philosophical Pragmatism that can be evidenced in all of his work.

Although I will focus on Alex's work in quality of life and social indicators, his influence continues to be felt in academic philosophy where he is well known as the founder and Editor in Chief of the oft-cited *Journal of Business Ethics*. When I first met Alex, I knew him as a philosopher having read his *Principles of Logic* (1969), and *The Popper-Carnap Controversy* (1970). His reviews in philosophical journals were always incisive and very interesting to read, and a gold mine for graduate students interested in broad perspective on philosophical problems.

Alex is currently Emeritus Professor in Political Science at the University of Northern British Columbia, where he taught from 1994 to 2001 and served as Chancellor from 2007 to 2010. He was Professor of Philosophy at University of Guelph from 1966 to 1994, and Assistant Professor at State University of New York (1964–1966) and at State College, St. Cloud (1962–1964). Alex earned his Ph.D. in Philosophy of Science (1965), B.D. in history of religions and M.A. in logic (1961) all from the University of Chicago, and his B.A. from Western Reserve University (1957).

One can imagine how precarious it feels to try and capture such a productive and influential scholarly life as Alex's in a limited number of words so I will relieve myself of any such aspirations and give you what I believe are his most impactful contributions to quality of life and social indicators research and make him an unprecedented pioneer in the field.

1. His creation and ongoing editorship of the journal *Social Indicators Research*. Alex, and a small band of fellow pioneers, founded the journal in 1974. Alex has remained at the helm of the journal through its 114 volumes and 3149 articles published to date. The journal is important in the history of the discipline because it gave scholars an identity as well a place to publish (and read) work in the field. The journal, like Alex himself, takes a broad view of the field and includes empirical, philosophical and methodological studies.
2. His 1985 paper introducing, describing, and empirically testing Multiple Discrepancies Theory (MDT) is developed with an eye to conceptual detail and is an exemplar of solid theory building and testing. In the paper, Alex clearly states six basic hypotheses, extensive supporting evidence, and how the basic hypotheses yield five derived hypotheses that lend themselves to empirical test. The clarity and rigorous account, including the historical antecedents, is what makes the paper a required reading, and a lovely exemplar of how a seasoned philosopher of science builds and empirically tests theories in the social sciences.
3. His comprehensive 1991 four-volume *Global Report on Student Well-being*. The data are rich and the analyses are detailed.